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Globalizing Representative Democracy:
The Emergence of Multilayered
International Parliamentarism
BY DAVOR JAN(IIC*

Abstract
As globalization penetrates the realm of democracy, the
internationalization of the institution of parliament, as the epitome of
popular representation in liberal democracies - continues to be
largely ignored by key studies in international law, constitutional law
and global governance. This article seeks to place international
parliamentarism on the radar of legal scholarship, reassess the value
that representative democracy has in the globalized world, and
demonstrate that understanding parliaments as purely domestic
institutions immune from international integrative forces is no longer
tenable. This article argues that international interparliamentary
relations do not occur merely within isolated forums but can and do
de facto evolve in layers of overlapping forums whenever

* Dr. Davor Janid is a Senior Researcher in EU Law at the T.M.C. Asser Institute, The
Hague, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam. This article was written while I
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of the working paper. The author is grateful to Prof. Damian Chalmers, Prof. Panos
Koutrakos, Dr. Frederik Ponjaert, Silvia Mergulhao, the LSE WP, and UC Hastings
editorial teams, and the conference participants for their very constructive feedback.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 38:2

circumstances allow it. To capture this phenomenon, the article
conceptualizes multilayered international parliamentarism as
developing in webs of linkages between the same parliamentary
institutions in various bilateral and multilateral frameworks
regarding the same region. This represents the most complex form
of parliamentarism in contemporary global affairs. To demonstrate
this, the article conducts an in-depth case study of relations between
the parliaments of the EU and Brazil and examines the reaction of the
Brazilian and supranational regional Latin American parliaments to
the EU Returns Directive. The analysis shows that the traditional,
inward-looking role of parliaments is gradually changing under the
pressure of transnational policy challenges. Increased international
contacts among parliaments accentuate their deliberative functions
and create new avenues for parliamentary input in international
affairs. This kind of interaction fosters the "diplomatic" actorship of
parliaments in foreign affairs in a concerted attempt to
counterbalance intergovernmental and transgovernmental ways of
doing politics and making law.
Keywords
Globalization, global governance, parliament, democracy,
European Union, Brazil, international parliamentary institutions,
immigration
I. Introduction
In democracies, parliaments embody the principle of popular
representation, ensuring that decisions made by their political
community are infused with the interests, preferences and values of
the electorate. Parliaments' main roles are to make legislation, adopt
a budget and hold the executive accountable for policy-making and
implementation of the law. Domestic politics and lawmaking are
thus the core of parliamentary business worldwide. However, the
role of parliaments is changing due to a variety of factors occurring
in the last couple of decades. Globalization has brought domestic and
foreign policy much closer together. Concomitantly, the many
projects of regional integration on virtually all continents incorporate
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some form of parliamentary body.'
Given the rapid
transnationalization of policy making, the globalization of democracy
emerges as "the key political issue of our times." 2 As Franck signaled
twenty years ago, democracy is becoming a "global entitlement" that
collective international processes will increasingly promote and
protect. 3 In this regard, parliaments have begun developing their
own global portfolios independently of their governments particularly after the end of the Second World War and of the Cold
War. 4 In the modern era, the rising number of global pressures and
challenges that face individual states have accelerated the
institutional vicissitude of parliaments and caused them to cross
paths on the international level. The interaction of domestic, regional
or international parliamentary bodies, on matters of common policy
interest across multiple levels of governance beyond the state,
represents the most complex form of parliamentarism in global
affairs. This multilayered nature of international parliamentarism is
the central structural facet of the globalization of representative
democracy and this article analyses this phenomenon on a detailed
case study of the relations between the EU and Brazil and of their
parliaments' individual and collective entanglement in the adoption
of the EU's Returns Directive.
Action through a multitude of transnational bodies to advance
domestic interests and ensure a measure of legitimacy of transnational
governance outcomes is a pertinent dimension of the global democratic
effort of parliaments. It gives rise to "new forms of public life and new
ways of debating regional and global issues," which Held detected
some decade and a half ago.5 While globalization penetrates the realm

1. See

PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS OF REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION:

THE ROLE OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS

(Olivier Costa et al. eds., 2013);
(Ulrich

REGIONAL INTEGRATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Volz ed., 2011); FINN LAURSEN, COMPARATIVE REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND
BEYOND (2010).
2. HEIKKI PATOMAKI & TEIVO TEIVAINEN, A POSSIBLE WORLD: DEMOCRATIC
TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2004).
3. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992).
4. Zlatko Sabi , Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of
InternationalParliamentaryInstitutions, 61 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 256, 260-61 (2008).
5. David Held, Democracy and Globalization, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL
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of democracy the international performance of other non-state actors,
such as the global civil society, 6 transnational corporations, 7 and
transnational religious actors, 8 is widely acknowledged in academic
scholarship; the internationalization of the institution of parliament, as
the epitome of political participation and pluralism in liberal
democracies, continues to be largely ignored by the leading studies in
international law, constitutional law and global governance. 9 Even
where this trend is affirmed, it is conceived merely as a "surrogate" or
an "alternative" means of legitimation and democratization at the
transnational level.' 0 This is not surprising, however. As Crawford
and Marks have argued, the uneasy exportation of democracy beyond
the nation state is rooted in international law's official indifference to,
and detachment from, national political organization."l

COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 11, 24 (Daniele Archibugi et al.

eds., 1998).
6. Mary Kaldor, The Idea of Global Civil Society, 79 INT'L AFF. 583 (2003); JOHN
KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? (2003).
See also Joachim Hirsch, The Democratic
Potential of Non-Governmental Organizations, in TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY:
POLITICAL SPACES AND BORDER CROSSINGS 195 (James Anderson ed., 2002); Brigitte
Beauzamy, Transnational Social Movements and Democratic Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY
BEYOND THE STATE? RE-EXAMINING THE DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS OF TRANSNATIONAL

ACTORS 110 (Eva Erman & Anders Uhlin eds., 2010).
7. Doris Fuchs et al., Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Corporationsin Global
Governance, in LEGITIMACY BEYOND THE STATE? RE-EXAMINING THE DEMOCRATIC
CREDENTIALS OF TRANSNATIONAL AcroRs 41 (Eva Erman & Anders Uhlin eds., 2010);
Karsten Ronit, TransnationalCorporationsand the Regulation of Business at the Global Level,
in Bob Reinalda (ed.), THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO NON-STATE AcroRs 75
(Bob Reinalda ed., 2011); MAXIM BAER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ACTORS IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2013); James Goodman, Contesting CorporateGlobalism:Sources of
Power, Channelsfor Democratization, in TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL SPACES
AND BORDER CROSSINGS 215 (James Anderson ed., 2002).
8. JEFFREY HAYNES, RELIGIOUS TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AND SOFT POWER (2012).
9. See similarly Chadwick F. Alger, Expanding Governmental Diversity:
Parliamentariansof States and Local Governments, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 74 (2010);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heartof the Liberal DemocraticOrder,
in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199, 200 (Gregory H. Fox &
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
10. Jost DelbrUck, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational
Democracy and/orAlternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
41 (2003).
11. James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit: An Essay in
International Law and Its Limits, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN
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The objective of this contribution is therefore to place
international parliamentarism on the radar of legal scholarship and
demonstrate that its layered operation is not a constitutional
idiosyncrasy of the EU, as the world's most fertile site for
interparliamentary cooperation, 12 but that it is also flourishing on the
global stage and in less obvious situations. To this end, I reassess the
value of representative democracy in the globalized world and
demonstrate that understanding parliaments as purely domestic
institutions, immune from international integrative forces, is no
Nation-state representative democracy is
longer accurate.
undergoing metamorphosis because parliaments have pierced the
veil of the global realm. 13 The effects thereof, nonetheless, are yet to
be felt in global governance processes in the years to come.
To elucidate these claims, this contribution argues that
international interparliamentary relations do not occur merely within
international parliamentary institutions ("IPIs") as isolated forums
but can and do de facto evolve in layers of overlapping forums
whenever circumstances allow it. This in turn shapes the way
parliaments exercise their constitutional functions in international
affairs. These two considerations form the nucleus of multilayered
international parliamentarism, whose occurrence is an institutional
response to the globalization of law and politics in general.
Parliaments' functions are moulded by ever narrower gaps between
nations, states and citizens. Increased international contacts among

COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 72, 72-73 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998).

12. Cristina Fasone, InterparliamentaryCooperation and Democratic Representation
in the European Union, in THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 41 (Sandra Kr6ger & Dawid Friedrich eds., 2012); Donatella M.
Viola, Interparliamentary Cooperation in the European Union: Towards Multilevel
Governance,in EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: POLICY MAKING BETWEEN POLITICIZATION AND
CONTROL 165 (G.P.E. Walzenbach ed., 2006); Christina Bengtson, Interparliamentary
Cooperationwithin Europe, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS WITHIN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN
UNION: FROM VICTIMS OF INTEGRATION TO COMPETITIVE ACTORS? 46 (John O'Brennan &
Tapio Raunio eds., 2007). Yet European interparliamentary collaboration certainly
experiences its own obstacles. See Olivier Costa & Marta Latek, Paradoxes et Limites
de la Coopdration Interparlementairedans ' Union Europienne,23 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 139
(2001).
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal
Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 218
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
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parliaments foster their "diplomatic" actorship in foreign affairs, in a
concerted attempt to counterbalance globalization-propelled
intergovernmental and transgovernmental ways of doing politics and
This accentuates the deliberative function of
making law.
parliaments and attenuates the drawbacks of "negotiated
democracy," whereby governments agree on transnational rules
without much parliamentary interference. The development of
international parliamentarism via mutually interlaced forums fosters
"deliberative negotiation democracy." 14 This article hence subscribes
to the approach of systemic deliberative democracy, which posits that
no single deliberative forum, including parliaments, is sufficiently
Instead, the
capable of legitimizing decisions on its own.
interdependencies between and among individual sites for the
politicization of policy making ought to be integrated into the
analysis because they can make up for the deficiencies of any given
site and thereby improve the democratic quality of the entire
15
system.
What the study of EU-Brazil relations shows is that not only do
parliaments take an active part in international policy-making
processes, they coalesce and act strategically in pursuance of common
goals. They create new bodies, initiate innovative participatory
processes, and engineer novel modes of involvement in order to
provide a check on governmental actors in global affairs. This
increases their capacity for political influence. However, even
multilayered international parliamentarism, despite its virtues,
suffers from the impact deficit. To wit, the influence of the
international action of parliaments on lawmaking remains limited to
advocacy and is commensurate to the argumentative force of their
pronouncements due to the absence of legal powers to enforce their
internationally crafted decisions. This might nevertheless indirectly
influence decision-making in the future.

14. Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
281 (Janne E. Nijman &
Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
15. Jane Mansbridge et al., A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy, in
DELIBERATIVE SYSTEMS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AT THE LARGE SCALE 1, 2-3 (John
Parkinson & Jane Mansbridge eds., 2012).
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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The structure of the article is as follows. First, the most relevant
theoretical approaches to transnational democracy are analysed in
international parliamentarism and
order to contextualize
demonstrate how little attention law and political science scholarship
has hitherto paid to the role that parliamentarians can play in global
affairs. 16 Second, these doctrinal insights are utilized to conceptualize
multilayered international parliamentarism, which is done by
dissecting its structure and explaining global parliamentary layering.
Third, in order to depict the existence and operation of parliamentary
interdependence on the international level, a thorough case study of
EU-Brazil relations is conducted. The legal and political bases for
bilateral interparliamentary cooperation are inspected through the
lens of formal arrangements and examples from political praxis. To
illustrate the multilayered character of interparliamentary liaison, the
analysis continues with an examination of the multilateral
parliamentary links that evolve between these two polities within the
Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat) as well as
through the European Parliament's (EP's) cooperation with the
Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) and the Latin American Parliament
(Parlatino).
Fourth, on this basis, multilayered international
parliamentarism is exemplified with an in-depth empirical insight
into the reaction of Latin American parliaments to the EU's Returns
Directive. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the implications of
multilayered international parliamentarism for the democratization
of international law and politics, since this phenomenon is not
restricted to the EP's global actorness but may apply in many other
20
regions of the world, 17 such as Africa,18 Asia 19 or North America.
The descriptive narrative of the analysis serves to expose the

16. Discussing democracy in complete isolation from its key and most ubiquitous
institutional form - the parliament - is quite common in transnational democratic
theory analyses. See, e.g., JONAS TALLBERG & CHRISTERJONSSON, TRANSNATIONAL AcToRS
IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PATTERNS, EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2010); Anthony

McGrew, TransnationalDemocracy, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY TODAY: CHALLENGES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 269 (April Carter & Geoffrey Stokes eds., 2001); John S. Dryzek,
TransnationalDemocracy, 7 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 30 (1999).
17. GEORGIOS PAPANAGNOU ET AL., DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN THE REGIONAL
CONTEXT: INSIGHTS FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND BEYOND (2014).
18. Julien Navarro, The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary
Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament,16 J. LEGIS. STUD. 195 (2010); Sarah
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empirical wealth and variety of institutionalized forms of
interparliamentary cooperaton, to unveil the corresponding
opportunities for input in international decision-making, as well as to
discuss the actual and potential impact of multilayered international
parliamentarism. The article, however, intends neither to categorize
international parliamentarism nor to gauge the foreign affairs powers
of parliaments -but rather to shed light on their shaping in the fastmoving political space of the 21st century.
II. Globalizing the Role of Parliaments:
Theoretical Approaches
A. The Idea of InternationalParliamentarismand Democratic
Legitimacy
Lawyers and political scientists alike diagnose the problem of
democratic legitimacy in global governance and acknowledge that
globalization significantly impinges on democracy and on the
traditional functions and functioning of parliaments. 21 The most
conspicuous institutional response to this problem is the creation of
regional, interregional and other international parliamentary
institutions ("IPIs"),22 some of which may have a global outreach such
Delputte, The ACP-EU Joint ParliamentaryAssembly Seen by its Members: Empowering
the Voice of People'sRepresentatives, 17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 241 (2012).
19. Jtirgen Rtiland, Participation without Democratization: The ASEAN
Interparliamentary Assembly (AIPA) and ASEAN's Regional Corporatism, in
PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS OF REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION: THE ROLE OF

INTERPARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS 166 (Olivier Costa et al. eds., 2013).

20. Davor Jan6i, The Transatlantic Connection: Democratizing Euro-American
Relations through Parliamentary Liaison, in THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 178 (Stelios Stavridis & Daniela Irrera eds., 2015).
21. Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process, 25
INT'L ORG. 706 (1971); Thomas Risse, Transnational Governance and Legitimacy, in
GOVERNANCE

AND

DEMOCRACY:

COMPARING

NATIONAL,

EUROPEAN

AND

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 180 (Arthur Benz & Yannis Papadopoulos eds., 2006);
Michael Zirn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOVT AND OPPOSITION
260 (2004); R. 0. Keohane, Global Governanceand DemocraticAccountability, in TAMING
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 132 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-

Archibugi eds., 2003); Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, 36
EUR. J. POL.RES. 1 (1999).
22. See generally Robert Cutler, The Emergence of International Parliamentary
Institutions:New Networks of Influence in World Society, in WHO ISAFRAID OF THE STATE?
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as the Inter-Parliamentary Union.23 However, except for the debate
on the world parliament, 24 many a scholar falls into the state-centric
trap of dismissing or neglecting the international role of parliaments
on the grounds that representative, and especially parliamentary,
democracy is bound to the state.25 While the actorship of parliaments
beyond the state is undeniably subject to a set of pitfalls, 26 it is
precisely the connection with the domestic mechanisms of
parliamentary democracy that makes international parliamentarism
27
a meaningful activity of electoral representatives in foreign affairs.
As Peters rightly observes, this connection is ensured by the
parliamentarians' double mandate, whereby they are democratic
representatives in both domestic and international arenas. 28 This
201 (Gordon S. Smith & Daniel
Wolfish eds., 2011); Andrea Cofelice, Interregional ParliamentaryAssemblies: A New
Layer in the Multilevel Global Governance System, in INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: A HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH 277 (Leonce
Bekemans ed., 2012); CLAUDIA KISSLING, THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS (2011); Heinrich Klebes, The
Development of InternationalParliamentaryInstitutions, 159 CONST. & PARLIAMENTARY
INFO. 77 (1990).
23. CHRISTIAN
L.
LANGE,
PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT
AND
THE
CANADA IN A WORLD OF MULTIPLE CENTRES OF POWER

INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION (1911); YEFIME ZARJEVSKI, THE PEOPLE HAVE THE FLOOR:

A HISTORY OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION (1989).

24. Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000); Richard
Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament,80 FOREIGN AFF. 212 (2001); Daniele
Archibugi & David Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents, 25 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 433 (2011); John S. Dryzek, Toward a DeliberativeGlobal Citizens' Assembly, 2 GLOBAL
POL'Y 33 (2011); Heikki PatomAki, Rethinking Global Parliament:Beyond the Indeterminacy
of InternationalLaw, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 375 (2007).
25. Alexander Somek, The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing
TransnationalDemocracy, 16 EUR. L. J. 391(2010); Jan Aart Scholte, Reinventing Global
Democracy, 20 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 12 (2014); James N. Rosenau, Governance and
Democracy in a Globalizing World, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN
COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 40 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998).
26. Ulrika Mbrth, Soft Regulation and Global Democracy, in TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 119, 133 (Marie-Laure Djelic

& Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006); Magdalena Bexell et al., Democracy in Global
Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of TransnationalActors, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
88 (2010).
27. See also KLAUS DINGWERTH, THE NEW TRANSNATIONALISM: TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 50 (2007).
28. Anne Peters, Dual Democracy, in JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
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role-splitting, as Scelle dubbed it,29 is paramount to the establishment
of what Slaughter sees as the new world order, in which the
institution of a single world government is replaced with numerous
networked institutions that substantively perform the functions of a
world government without possessing the form.30 Indeed, without a
possibility to employ domestic politics to its rescue, international
parliamentary evolution would have considerably less constitutional
and policy importance. Put more broadly, international law and
governance are not immune from the democratic safeguards of the
domestic legal order; quite to the contrary, the latter buttresses and
enhances the former.
In this regard, insights from the studies of international and
transnational constitutionalism provide useful cues for ascertaining
the consequences that parliaments are facing due to the globalizing
tendencies in the politico-legal sphere. 31 Kumm's cosmopolitan
constitutionalism is particularly thought-provoking insofar as it
permits the exportation of the idea of the constraint of public power
beyond the state. However, he denies the importance of what he calls
"electoral accountability" 32 and views the domestic parliament as
"the great institutional loser," 33 while disregarding the myriad of
international parliamentary bodies in which these very domestic
parliaments participate. Cohen and Sabel furthermore hold that the
creation of new institutions of electoral accountability at the global
level is not necessary, emphasizing instead the importance of forming
324 (2009).
29. Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" (Didoublement
Fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 210 (1990).
30. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 235

(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
31. See further Davor Jani6, TransnationalParliamentarismand Global Governance:
The New Practice of Democracy, in THE ACTORS OF POSTNATIONAL RULEMAKING:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Elaine Fahey
ed., forthcoming in 2015).
32. Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism:On the Relationship
between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in RULING THE WORLD:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258,296 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Joel. P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
33. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 915 (2004).
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a global public sphere and demos. 34 Yet they ignore the role that
parliaments, as venerable arenas for public debate, could play in this
regard. Conversely, De Birca and Krisch, each in their own way, are
correct in defending the construction of democracy in the
international sphere as complementary to domestic democratic
processes on the grounds that the exercise of public power beyond
the state affects the citizen in much the same way as it does within the
state. 35 In a similar vein, Walker argues that even transnational
polities, which are not based on electoral legitimation methods, can
be meta-democratically validated through the agency of
transnational parliamentarism. 36
In the context of the
constitutionalization of international law, Habermas adds that if new
forms of transnational governance were to boost democratic
legitimacy, they must "connect up" with the existing modes of
legitimation of the constitutional state, while concomitantly
supplementing them with their own legitimation mechanisms. 37 In
this sense, I support Dobner's argument that the democratic
legitimacy of governance must be transferred to the global arena not
because national democratic governance is matter of mythology and
constitutional idolatry, but because it is an inalienable right without
which the globalization of law would be objectionable. 38 Let us now
probe the more concrete implications the globalizing trends entail for
the actual functioning of parliaments.
B. The Functioning of InternationalParliamentarism
Against the backdrop of the above considerations, international

34. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy,37 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL.
766 (2005).
35. Grdinne de B~irca, Developing Democracy beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 240 (2008); Nico KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW 86, 266 (2010).
36. Neil Walker, PostnationalConstitutionalismand PostnationalPublic Law: A Tale
of Two Neologisms, 3 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 79 (2012).
37. JUrgen Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the
Legitimation Problemsof a Constitutionfor World Society, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 445 (2008)
(emphasis in original).
38. Petra Dobner, More Law, Less Democracy? Democracy and Transnational
Constitutionalism, in PETRA DOBNER AND MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTIT'TIONALISM? 152 (2010).
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parliamentarism, as a phenomenon whereby parliaments take an
active part in world affairs and perform a plethora of activities
beyond the constitutional confines of their legal orders, appears
curious for several reasons. abiR questions why parliamentarians
engage in this type of action despite the sheer number of
disincentives, which are rooted in the constituency-oriented, local or
even parochial nature of their work. 39 In her New World Order,
Slaughter speaks of legislative networks as weak forums with little
influence, precisely because of parliamentarians' electoral
"dependence," whereby they are elected to defend the interests of
their voters and not the interests of the voters of other countries,
regions and entities. Therefrom flow other constraints such as the
lack of benefit for re-election, the lack of time due to the need to focus
on domestic matters, quick turnover of parliamentarians in and out
of office following electoral cycles, and low visibility of their
40
international efforts.
Even so, most authors view international parliamentarism as
positive and desirable in terms of constitutionalism and good
governance. For abiR, parliamentarians acting globally add both
democratic legitimacy and transparency to international affairs by
resorting to institutional pressure, persuasion and advocacy in order
to promote their positions. 41 They thereby stimulate public debate
and facilitate the development of shared norms and values in an
interdependent world. 42 Slaughter, for her part, argues that the
legislators' role need not only be to directly affect international
policy-making, but can also be to enhance their monitoring of the
international activity of the executive branch. 43 They may also engage
39. Zlatko abik, Building Democraticand Responsible Global Governance:The Role of
InternationalParliamentaryInstitutions,61 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 256 (2008).
40. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 105 (2004).
41. Zlatko abiR, Building Democraticand Responsible Global Governance:The Role of
InternationalParliamentaryInstitutions,61 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 255, 258.
42. Zlatko abik, Democracy across Borders: Parliamentariansand InternationalPublic
Spheres, 15 JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC 77 (2008).
43. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 122, 129 (2004). It has
similarly been argued that international parliamentarism may help to prevent
lethargy and nonresponsiveness of governmental actors. See Zlatko abik, Democracy
acrossBorders: Parliamentariansand InternationalPublic Spheres, 15 JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC
80 (2008).
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in capacity building through training and technical assistance
programmes. 44 Importantly, she views IPIs both as catalysts, sparking
further integration or facilitating the removal of trade barriers, and as
correctives, rectifying the imbalances created by executive dominance
in international affairs. 45 In this vein, Kraft-Kasack observes that
while
policy
outputs
are
improved
through
political
internationalization, the democratic legitimacy of such processes is
acutely deficient. 46 She argues that transnational parliamentary
assemblies only marginally reduce the democratic deficit of
international governance, due to their aloofness from the public,
insufficient incorporation of their work in domestic parliaments, and
various institutional shortcomings that hamper constancy and
coherence of their work, such as understaffed secretariats and the lack
of permanent delegations. 47 Despite this, she concludes that
transnational parliamentary assemblies may "contribute to the
formation of a transnational public sphere." 48 Cutler, too, maintains
49
that IPIs have a "special communicative role in world society."
Similarly, Malamud and Stavridis submit that even though regional
integration parliaments more often than not fail to carry out
distinctive parliamentary functions, they aid intraregional
communication and nurture a shared regional identity among
50
political elites.
Yet the existing literature treats international parliamentarism as
a standalone integrative force, without paying heed to the diversity

44. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Futureof InternationalLaw
PERSPECTrIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (Janne E. Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds.,
2007).
45. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 105 (2004).
46. Christiane Kraft-Kasack, TransnationalParliamentaryAssemblies: A Remedy for
the DemocraticDeficit of InternationalGovernance?, 31 W. EUR. POL. 534 (2008).
47. Christiane Kraft-Kasack, TransnationalParliamentaryAssemblies: A Remedy for
the DemocraticDeficit of InternationalGovernance? 31 W. EUR. POL. 534, 552-553 (2008).
48. Id. at 553.
49. Robert Cutler, International ParliamentaryInstitutions as Organizations, 4 J.
INT'L ORG. STUD. 104 (2013).
50. Andr~s Malamud & Stelios Stavridis, Parliaments and Parliamentariansas
International Actors, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO NON-STATE AcTORS
101, 114 (Bob Reinalda ed., 2011).

is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), in NEW
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of underlying relations between parliamentarians across various
forums. In speaking about the future of global governance, Kennedy
has argued that the objective of "new politics" is to carry the
democratic values of individual rights, economic self-sufficiency,
citizenship, community empowerment and political participation to
the sites of global and transnational authority.51 This opening and
multiplication of arenas for political contestation, conflict and
struggle in search of greater conversation, heterogeneity, interaction
and ethical pluralism is precisely where multilayered international
parliamentarism makes its greatest contribution.
Conducting
parliamentary work across layers fertilizes the political stratum that
conditions the creation, implementation and application of law,
rather than just nurturing parliaments' lawmaking capacity.
The diversification of the avenues of parliamentary
communication contributes to addressing legislative divergences,
interdependencies and externalities by means of argument-based
"parliamentary lobbying." International parliamentarism is hence a
massive conveyor belt for interest mediation between the centres of
democratic gravity, which remain entrenched in domestic political
arenas, structured by domestic levers of constitutionalism and
arbitrated through domestic public spheres. In this regard, Besson's
argument that globalization and growing interdependence falsify the
presumption that national democracy is the most inclusive and
52
deliberative locus of decision-making, is still a difficult one to make,
as domestic political realms continue to guarantee the highest degree
of participation, the greatest possibility for structured deliberation,
and the most extensive safeguards for the enforcement of
parliamentary rights in the political process. The globalization of
parliaments therefore still has a chiefly domestic effect. International
parliamentarism enhances domestic law, politics and governance
without putting them in jeopardy; it complements national
democracy without supplanting it.

51. David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?
67 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
52. Samantha Besson, Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism,
and Democracy, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 381, 404 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37,
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The same applies to the European Union. The international
activity of the EP does not thwart EU democracy, but upgrades it by
informing EU decision-making and enriching the public debate. In
this regard, Bieber's description of the EP's global endeavour
confirms the internal rootedness thereof:
The European Parliament's activities in the sphere of general
international politics provides the most striking example of a
parliament's modern role in this field... The Parliament's role as an
international forum may amplify the common values of western
civilization and hence renders them effective either by influencing
governments of Member States and third nations or by directly
strengthening them as parameters of the international order. The
internationaleffect of Parliament'srole as a forum is based on an internal
function which only the Parliament can fulfill: the capacity to
aggregate the internal support of the European peoples for those
53
basic values.
As the most advanced transnational assembly in the world, the
EP has the greatest democratic credentials to lead parliamentary
legitimization of policy-making beyond the state and has so far
played a "crucial role in shaping interparliamentary relations at all
levels of regional cooperation." 54 This is why this article adopts an
EU perspective.

III. The Concept of Multilayered International
Parliamentarism •
A. The Structure of InternationalParliamentarism
Parliamentary engagement in international affairs is chiefly

53. Roland Bieber, Democratic Control of International Relations of the European
Union, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 105, 110
(Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2002) (emphasis added).
54. Andrea Cofelice & Stelios Stavridis, The EuropeanParliamentas an International
ParliamentaryInstitution (IPI)19 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REv. 145, 165 (2014).
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threefold and it consists of influencing foreign policy domestically,
and
establishing
parliamentary
diplomacy,
conducting
55
parliamentary bodies of international organizations.
These three
activities are closely intertwined. First, the absence of significant
decision-making power incites parliaments to externalize domestic
scrutiny of foreign policy beyond the borders of their polities in order
to maximize their effectiveness, increase their impact on executive
decisions and, generally, counteract the "hollowing out of domestic
democracy." 56 By the same token, parliamentary diplomacy is the key
substantive component and a conditio sine qua non of the
parliamentarisation of international organizations. 57 The third type of
parliamentary engagement is the foremost manifestation of what
Walker has labeled "transnational parliamentarianism."5 8 There is,
nevertheless, a whole spectrum of appellations for this phenomenon.
The most common one is international parliamentary institutions
("IPIs"), which Cutler defines as international institutional forums for
multilateral deliberations in which at least three states or
transgovernmental units are represented by parliamentarians. 59 They
can be further classified into international parliamentary organs
("IPOs") and international parliamentary associations("IPAs),60 which
55. Andr~s Malamud & Stelios Stavridis, Parliaments and Parliamentariansas
International Actors, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO NON-STATE AcToRs
101, 101 (Bob Reinalda ed., 2011).
56. Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions,in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 284 (Andre
Nollkaemper & Janne E. Nijman eds., 2007).
57. Olivier Costa & Clarissa Dri, How Does the EuropeanParliamentContributeto the
EU's Interregional Dialogue?, in INTERSECTING INTERREGIONALISM: REGIONS, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE AND THE EU 121, 141 (Francis Baert et al. eds., 2014); Daniel Fiott, On the
Value of ParliamentaryDiplomacy, 4 MADARIAGA PAPER NO. 7, 1, 6 (2011); Davor Jani4,
Parliamentary Diplomacy in the European Union, in DE SAMENGESTELDE BESSELINK:
BRUGGEN BouwEN TUSSEN NATIONAAL, EUROPEES EN INTERNATIONAL REcHT 109 (Henk
Kummeling et al. eds., 2012); Daniel Thym, ParliamentaryInvolvement in European
InternationalRelations, in EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
201, 225 (Marise Cremona &Bruno de Witte eds., 2008).
58. Neil Walker, PostnationalConstitutionalismand PostnationalPublic Law: A Tale
of Two Neologisms, 3 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 80 (2012).
59. Robert Cutler, International Parliamentary Institutions as Organizations, 4 J.
INT'L ORG. STUD. 106 (2013).
60. Zlatko abi , BuildingDemocraticand Responsible GlobalGovernance: The Role of
InternationalParliamentaryInstitutions, 61 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRs 255, 258 (2008).
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differ insofar as the former belong to intergovernmental organizations
while the latter are independent, self-constituted groups of
parliamentarians. One may also speak of international or transnational
parliamentary assemblies.
Still, whichever phrase we use to define international
parliamentary action, each of them, as a rule, refers to multilateral
parliamentary cooperation.
The shortcoming of the existing
literature is that it places excessive focus on IPIs and treats them as
singular manifestations of international parliamentarism. This skews
the portrayal of the political reality - which is denser than the
current approaches suggest. This article submits, first, that bilateral
forums are also important frameworks for international
parliamentarism and, second, that there is an abundance of intricate
interactions across and between these multilateral and bilateral
forums. On the one hand, while multilateral cooperation may be the
most visible form of international parliamentarism, national
parliamentarians
(MPs,
senators
and
peers),
regional
parliamentarians (members of regional integration parliaments) and
supranational ones (members of the EP i.e. MEPs) engage in bilateral
relations of an international character too. 61 A notable example is the
Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue between the EP and the U.S.
Congress. 62 As this article shows, a similar arrangement has been
instituted between the EP and the Brazilian National Congress
(Congresso Nacional do Brasil). On the other hand, there are also
bilateral relations between IPIs themselves, such as those between the
EP and Parlasur. All of these frameworks are institutionalized forms
of parliamentarism that merit a separate place on the global
63
parliamentary map.

61. Celia Quispe, La Cooperaci6n Interparlamentariaen America Latina, 2 REVISTA
ANDINA DE EsTuDIos POLITIcOS 63, 71 (2012).

62. Davor Jan&il, The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping
Institutional Cooperation, in

A TRANSATLANTIC

COMMUNITY

OF

LAW:

PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS 35

LEGAL

(Elaine

Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014).
63. In broad functional terms, one may also conceive of international
parliamentarism in the context of "transnational advocacy networks" inasmuch as
international parliamentary bodies frequently resort to advocacy techniques to
achieve their goals. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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The Layering of InternationalParliamentarism

As a result of the proliferation of international parliamentary
bodies, the layers of interparliamentary cooperation have become
more diverse. Typically, the engagement of any given parliament, in
any given region, is exhausted by its participation in one international
parliamentary body established for that purpose, which mostly takes
the form of an IPI. However, this paradigm of "unidimensional"
international parliamentarism has become inaccurate, because there
are many instances of the same parliaments acting in different
international forums within the same region, which increases the
room for collaboration, strategic action and policy pronouncement.
For example, in the Mediterranean region, there is both the EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, as the parliamentary
component of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 64 and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. 65 The fact that Israeli,
Palestinian and Syrian parliamentarians are members of both of these
assemblies offers an important platform for parliamentary
diplomacy, dialogue and mediation between countries that are in
conflict or undergoing civil unrest or war. In the case of the region
located at the EU's eastern gates comprising certain post-Soviet
states, there is a significant overlap in the membership of the Euronest
Parliamentary Assembly, as the parliamentary element of the Eastern
Partnership, 66 and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation. 67 The region of South America furnishes
another notable example. The EP meets with Chilean and Mexican
parliamentarians both bilaterally within the respective EU-Chile and
EU-Mexico Joint Parliamentary Committees and multilaterally
In the case of Brazil,
within EuroLat and Parlatino.

64. Roderick Pace & Stelios Stavridis, The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Assembly, 2004-2008: Assessing the First Years of the Parliamentary Dimension of the
Barcelona Process, 21 MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY 90 (2010).
65. See Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, available at www.pam.int
(last visited on Sept. 8, 2014).
66. Hrant Kostanyan & Bruno Vandecasteele, The EuroNest Parliamentary
Assembly: The European Parliament as a Socializer of Its Counterparts in the EU's Eastern
Neighbourhood?, 5 COLLEGE OF EUROPE, EU DIPLOMACY PAPERS 4 (2013).
67. Cristina Fasone, The Baltic Sea Region as a Laboratory for Interparliamentary
"Dialogue," in PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS OF REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION:
THE ROLE OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS 126 (Olivier Costa et al eds., 2013).
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interparliamentary cooperation evolves not only in the form of
bilateral relations between the EP and the Brazilian Congress but also
multilaterally through EuroLat, Parlasur and Parlatino. Common to
all of these instances is the concurrent representation of the same
parliamentary body in multiple international parliamentary forums
devoted to the same region.
The international activity of parliaments is therefore multifarious
and, due to the transnational nature of contemporary policy-making,
it is likely to develop not only in the format of isolated parliamentary
frameworks, but also in that of interconnected webs of parliaments.
Parliaments may intersect within various international forums,
whether bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal, more or less
structured, and more or less empowered to issue pronouncements.
This interconnectedness between the same parliamentary institutions
across forums, regions and levels of governance casts the global role
of parliaments as less fragmented than it primafacie appears. In fact,
it is precisely what Slaughter calls the "disaggregation" of the nation
state, 68 or the participation of different government branches in
international relations as separate actors, which permits the
aggregation and synthesis of parliaments beyond the borders of a
single state. It is a way of providing flexibility for various state
institutions to develop their own agendas in foreign affairs, while
preserving a linkage to the fundamental attributes of statehood, such
as defined territory, population and the monopoly of the legitimate
69
use of force.
As a consequence, increasing contact between the same
parliamentary institutions on different topics carries concrete mutual
benefits. These include a greater potential for continuous debate and
consultation on contentious matters and the maintenance of a firmer
liaison between parliamentarians and their staff. This may help improve
their understanding of the common challenges and threats facing their

68. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public
Accountability of Global Government Networks, 39 GOVERNMENT AND OPPosmION 159,
161, 173 (2004).
69. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal
Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 200-201
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
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polities and catalyze the search for optimal policy solutions. 70 This, in
turn, increases the likelihood of polities respecting each other's
legislation, implementing mutual agreements, and avoiding political or
Multilayered international collaboration between
legal disputes.
parliaments can therefore boost their say in global and domestic politics
and corroborate their classic constitutional functions of legislating and
ensuring executive accountability.
International parliamentarism, furthermore, is multilayered not
only horizontally, i.e., between two or more same parliaments, but also
vertically, i.e., in a variety of formats. These formats may range from
inter-delegation meetings, formalized personal committee-tocommittee meetings, informal visits and videoconferences. With
these elements in mind, we define multilayered international
parliamentarism as the international activity that develops between
the same parliamentary bodies in two or more interparliamentary
forums in the same period regarding the same region. In the
remaining sections, we operationalize this concept with the example
of EU-Brazil relations.
IV. The European Parliament and the Brazilian Congress:
An Evolving Partnership?
A. BilateralEU-BrazilInterparliamentaryRelations
1. Legal Framework
The importance of democracy in EU-Brazil relations is visible
from the 1992 Framework Cooperation Agreement, 71 whose first
Article states that their cooperation is based on the respect for the
democratic principles and human rights. The Agreement regulates
collaboration in the fields such as trade, 72 investment, finance,
industry and technology and also acknowledges the value of mutual
70. Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
45, 59 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009).
71. Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the European Economic
Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil, art. 1-3, June 29, 1992, O.J. (L262)
54 (EC) [hereinafter Framework Agreement].
72. See generally Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers:
Towards Partnershipin Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J., 345, 382-386
(2009).
INTERNATIONAL LAW
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73
consultation on "international issues of mutual interest."
In the EU, the Agreement is operationalized through Brazil
Country Strategy Papers, which the European Commission
(Commission) publishes in order to provide guidance for the
implementation of the collaborative arrangements agreed. There have
so far been two such Papers, one for 2001-2006 and the other for 20072013. The latter states that the key objectives of enhancing bilateral
relations are to improve the sectoral dialogues between the EU and
Brazil, as well as to expand cooperation, exchanges and mutual
awareness between relevant institutions.74 While not explicitly stated,
this encompasses interparliamentary collaboration. The Commission
furthermore seeks to widen the interregional political dialogue and
facilitate the development of EU-Mercosur relations. 75
The main forum for bilateral EU-Brazil relations is the summit,
which is an intergovernmental gathering of European and Brazilian
leaders at the highest political level. The first such summit took place
in Lisbon in July 2007 and officially established a strategic partnership
between the EU and Brazil in order to address bilateral and
multilateral challenges. 76 The second summit, which was held in Rio
de Janeiro in December 2008, was of paramount importance for
bilateral parliamentarism. The then adopted Joint Action Plan laid
down a fivefold scheme to construct the Euro-Brazilian strategic
partnership and one of them is through people-to-people contacts.
Within this category, the Action Plan promotes twofold
interparliamentary interaction: (a) by initiating a regular structured

73. Framework Agreement, supra note 71, at art. 2.
74. European Commission, Brazil Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, at p. 26
(May 14, 2005).
75. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council - Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership,
(COM 281) 15 (2007).
76. See generally Richard G. Whitman & Annemarie P. Rodt, EU-Brazil Relations:
A Strategic Partnership?,17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV., 27-44 (2012); Eleonora Mesquita
Ceia, The New Approach of the European Union towards the Mercosur and the Strategic
Partnershipwith Brazil, 61 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 81 (2008); ENHANCING THE BRAZIL-EU
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: FROM THE BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TO THE GLOBAL (Michael
Emerson & Renata Fl6res eds., 2013); Bartlomiej Znojek, The European Union and Brazil
as Privileged Partners? Difficult Path to an Authentic Strategic Partnership,24 POLISH
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS POLICY PAPER 1 (2012).
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dialogue between MEPs and Brazilian Congressmen; and (b) by
direct inter-committee contacts on all subjects on common interest. 77
At the moment, there exist some 30 sectoral dialogues between the
EU and Brazil, which are aimed at exchanging know-how in various
areas. 78 One of them is the dialogue between the EP and the Brazilian
Congress. The fourth summit, held in Brasilia in July 2010,
acknowledged that bilateral interparliamentary cooperation has
commenced in the form of informal visits, for example, the visit of the
EP's Committee on International Trade and its Delegation for
relations with the Mercosur countries. 79 The fifth summit, organized
in Brussels in October 2011, brought new impetus. It recognized that
"parliaments are a fundamental expression of democratic values and
of people's representation in the democratic processes" and
concluded that visits and exchanges between the EP and the Brazilian
Congress had been increasing and solidifying since the onset of the
strategic partnership. Both sides expressed commitment to a further
strengthening of the interparliamentary dialogue.8 0 This dialogue is
supported by MEPs, who in 2009 called upon EU institutions and the
Brazilian Government to provide them with "regular and detailed
information on the state of play of the strategic partnership."81
2. Internal ParliamentaryOrganization
For the purpose of conducting its own international relations, the
European Parliament has established a host of interparliamentary
delegations. 82 In 2012 the EP passed a resolution stating that the

77. 2nd European Union - Brazil Sunmmit, Joint Action Plan, Rio de Janeiro,
December 22, 2008, 17602/08 (Presse 386) 39.
78. See Didlogos Setoriais, Presentation, available at http://sectordialogues.org/
en/pagina-estatica/project/ presentation (last visited March 27, 2014).
79. 4th European Union - Brazil Summit, Joint Statement, Brasilia, July 14, 2010,
12302/10 (Presse 209), 10.
80. 5th European Union - Brazil Summit, Joint Statement, Brussels, October 4,
2011, 15084/11 (Presse 348), 27-28.
81. European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council of March 12, 2009 on
the European Union-Brazil Strategic Partnership, 2010 O.J. (C 87E/168), 1(z)(ad)-(ae).
82. Anna Herranz, The InterparliamentaryDelegations of the European Parliament:

National and European Prioritiesat Work, in

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN EUROPEAN

FOREIGN POLICY: DEBATING ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

Anna Herranz eds., 2005).

77 (Esther Barbc &
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creation of a delegation specifically devoted to Brazil could be
considered. 83 They also advised that EU Delegations in the BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) should
include EP liaison officers so as to: (a) foster a greater understanding
of the national parliamentary dimension in each of those countries;
(b) promote closer bilateral cooperation and dialogue between the EP
and their national parliaments; and (c) promote democratic
accountability of the decision-making processes in the G-8 and the G20. Subsequently, in March 2014 the EP established a new Delegation
for relations with Brazil with a total of 14 members.8 4 This initiative
signifies that, although Mercosur has been the main framework of
EU-Brazil cooperation, there has been a shift in viewpoint whereby
Brazil is seen as both "a power in its own right" and as "an
increasingly important partner for Europe in dealing with all of the
major policy challenges that will need to be addressed in the twenty85
first century."
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies (Cmara dos Deputados) created a bicameral parliamentary
group for relations with the EU in June 2008.86 It is composed of 78
MPs and 22 senators. As a member of this group mentioned,
"parliamentary diplomacy is as important as official diplomacy. For
that reason, this parliamentary group will interact with the EP in
various matters, such as immigration, business, customs barriers,
sanitary barriers and education projects." 87 In addition, the Brazilian

83. European Parliament, Resolution on the EU Foreign Policy Towards the BRICS
and Other Emerging Powers: Objectives and Strategies, 2013 O.J. (C 239E/1), 28.
84. European Parliament, Decision of March 12, 2014 on the Number of
Interparliamentary Delegations, Delegations to Joint Parliamentary Committees and
Delegations to Parliamentary Cooperation Committees and to Multilateral
Parliamentary Assemblies, Euro. Parl. Doc. P7TA(2014)0217, point 1(e).
85. RIORDAN ROETr, THE NEW BRAZIL 141-42 (2010).
86. CAmara dos Deputados, Resoluqao no. 3/08 Que Cria o Grupo Parlamentar
Brasil-Uniio Europ~ia, Didrio da Camara dos Deputados of June 6, 2008, p. 25589.
87. See Halum Will be Sworn in on Wednesday ParliamentaryGroup Brazil European Union in the CNI in Brasilia(July 6, 2011), available at http://tlnoticias.
com.br/antigas/noticias/halum-sera-empossado-nesta-quarta-no-grupoparlamentar-brasil-uniao-europeia-na-cni-em-brasilia/23581/#.UzRRLY-NwSw
(last visited March 27, 2014).
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Foreign Affairs Ministry has a Department for Europe,88 whose work
is appraised by both Houses of the National Congress.
3. Mutual ParliamentaryAwareness and Pronouncement
The following empirical examples illustrate manifold regulatory
interdependence between the EU and Brazil. It is shown that their
legislatures pay heed to the interregional dimension of policy-making
and that they keep a watchful eye over each other's decision-making
processes.8 9
The EP occasionally comments on Brazilian legislative initiatives
that are of global or interregional importance, gives its views thereon,
and offers recommendations. For instance, some nine months in
advance of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, which
took place in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 to address global economic
and environmental challenges, the EP passed a resolution in which
concern was expressed about the Forest Code that the Brazilian
Senate was due to adopt. The reason for this alert was that the Code
would "exacerbate deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, thus
hindering international climate change mitigation efforts." MEPs
urged Brazil to "make a clear commitment to protect the Amazon
forest and stem criminal harassment of representatives of civil society
pursuing environmental protection." 90 On another occasion, the EP
invited developing countries to follow the example of Brazil's
successful Bolsa Familia(Family Grant) programme and devise similar
social protection schemes to shield the most vulnerable members of
their societies. 91 When it comes to food policy, MEPs raised objections
regarding, on the one hand, reports by the Brazilian National Health

88. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.itamaraty.gov.br/oministerio/conheca-o-ministerio/organograma/subsecretaria-geral-politica-i/deudepartamento-da-europa (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
89. See on EU-Brazilian interdependence in many areas: Alfredo Valladdo, L'UE
et le Brsil: Un PartenariatNaturel, in PARTNERSHIPS FOR EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM:
EU RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA AND RUSSIA (CHAILLOT PAPER No.

109) 34 et

seq (Giovanni Grevi & Alvaro de Vasconcelos eds., 2008).
90. European Parliament, Resolution of September 29, 2011 on Developing a
Common EU Position ahead of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20), 2011 O.J. (C 22E/114) 60, 61.
91. European Parliament, Resolution of April 18, 2013 on the Impact of the
Financial and Economic Crisis on Human Rights, 2013 O.J. (C 242E/260) 25.
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Surveillance Agency on the widespread use of pesticides that are
banned in the EU and that as such carry grave health risks and, on
the other hand, reports by the EU Food and Veterinary Office on the
"failure of Brazilian beef to meet EU producer and consumer
standards." 92 In the same policy field, the EP was also mindful of the
repercussions of EU policies for Brazil. To wit, MEPs prompted the
Commission to assess the impact of the reform of the EU's common
organization of the sugar market for Brazil's policies on sugar
production and processing. The objective was to deter Brazil's
"unsustainable latifundary method of sugar production," which is
dominated by a small number of individuals, to the detriment of the
many workers in sugar fields and factories. 93 In yet other
pronouncements, the EP emphasized the relevance of Brazilian
policies for the EU. For example, in order to improve EU
competitiveness and remove barriers to global trade, MEPs adopted
a resolution requesting the Commission, when framing EU policies,
to carry out systematic evaluations of similar policies by the EU's
major partners, among which Brazil. 94 EU-Brazil parliamentary
cooperation has also been promoted in the context of Internet
regulation. Namely, the EP underlined the importance of raising the
parliamentary profile of the Internet Governance Forum and
expressed eagerness to cooperate with the Brazilian, Indian and other
5
interested assemblies on these matters. 9
For its part, the Brazilian Congress maintains regular cognizance
of EU affairs in a variety of formats, including hearings with MEPs
and public expert debates. For instance, in October 2013, a working
group of the EP's Delegation for relations with Mercosur was hosted
in order to discuss the association agreement with Mercosur and the
development of the EU-Brazil partnership. Transpiring from the
Delegation's meetings with representatives of the external affairs
92. European Parliament, Report on EU Agriculture and International Trade,
2011 O.J. (C 199E/48) 52, 53.
93. European Parliament, Resolution on the Forthcoming Reform of the
Common Organization of the Market in Sugar, 2005 O.J. (C 320E/271), 30.
94. European Parliament, Resolution on the Single Market Review: Tackling
Barriers and Inefficiencies through Better Implementation and Enforcement, 2007
O.J. (C 187E/80), 43.
95. European Parliament, Resolution on the Second Internet Governance Forum
Held in Rio de Janeiro from November 12-15, 2007, 2008 O.J. (C61E/252), 4.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 38:2

committees of both Houses of the National Congress, was the EU's
awareness of the politico-economic importance of Brazil and its
leadership within Mercosur. 96 The same month, the Chamber of
Deputies' Committee for External Relations and National Defence
held a hearing with Daniel Cohn-Bendit MEP on climate change and
environment protection. 97 Furthermore, in March 2014 the Chamber
hosted a visit by an EP delegation, whose aim was to discuss the
internal functioning of the two parliaments, such as the legislative
process, voting, and the structure and operation of committees and
parliamentary groups. The meeting resulted in the conclusion of a
Memorandum of Understanding on the International Technical
Cooperation, which was also signed by the Brazilian Senate (Senado).
The goal of this Memorandum is to continue to share parliamentary
information, practices and working methods as well as to increase
mutual learning through exchange programmes for administrative
staff.98 The Senate also organizes expert hearings on EU topics. For
example, the impact of the Eurozone crisis on EU-Brazil commercial
relations and on the Brazilian economy were publically discussed in
the Committee for External Relations and National Defence in
September 2011 and March 2012. 99 This is precisely the period
surrounding the EU's adoption of the so-called Six Pack of measures
intended to reform Stability and Growth Pact.100 It has indeed been
argued that, while the EU remains an attractive commercial partner

96. See Delega~ao da Unido Europeia na Reptiblica de Brasil, Visita de grupo de
trabalho ao Brasil, de 27 a 31 de outubro de 2013: perspectiva de urn acordo de
associaqao entre a Uniao Europeia e o Mercosul, , (January 11, 2013), available at
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/press-corner/all-news/news/2013/20
131101_01 pt.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
97. Cimara dos Deputados, Requerirnento no. 315/2013 (July, 16, 2013), available
at www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao =585557
(last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
98. See Diretores firmrnam acordo permanente de cooperaqdo entre Parlamentos
brasileiro e europeu (March 21, 2014), available at wwwl2.senado.gov.br/noticias/
materias/2014/03/21/diretores-firmam-acordo-permanente-de-cooperacao-entreparlamentos-brasileiro-e-europeu (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
99. See Comissio de Relaq5es Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (April 04,2013), available
at www.senado.gov.br/atividade/comissoes/CRE/audPub.asp (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
100. See also THE EUROZONE CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 106-107 (Kaarlo
Tuori & Klaus Tuori, 2014).
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to Brazil, the sovereign debt crisis has severely challenged the appeal
of the EU model for regional integration in Latin America.1 01
However, this is not always the case, as shown by the Brazilian
102
senators' examination of the EU's Water Framework Directive.
Due to the similarities between the EU's and Brazil's difficulties in
implementing policies in the very diverse regions existing within
their territories, in May 2009 the Senate's Committee for
Environment, Consumer Protection, Supervision and Control
conducted a comparison between EU legislation and the National
Water Resources Policy enacted by the Brazilian Water Act. 10 3 The
Committee Chairman, Renato Casagrande, suggested that EU policy
could be used as a model for regulating transnational water paths
within Mercosur. 104
These examples document the wealth of advocacy practices of
the EU and Brazilian parliaments in numerous policy fields. Their
importance lies in the mutual awareness of the respective regulatory
and decision-making processes. These are crucial ingredients of
multilayered international parliamentarism because the search for
policy rapprochement may spill over to mutual multilateral forums,
as outlined below.
B. Multilateral EU-Brazil Interparliamentary Relations
The lynchpin of multilayered international parliamentarism is
the fact that representatives of two same parliamentary bodies meet
in different international parliamentary forums devoted to the same
region. In the case of the EU and Brazil, this unravels within three
frameworks - EuroLat, Mercosur and Parlatino - which are
examined in turn below.

101. Elena Lazarou, A Paradigmin Trouble? The Effects of the Euro Crisison the European
Model for Regional Integrationin South America, in REGIONS AND CRISES: NEw CHALLENGES
FOR CONTEMPORARY REGIONALISMS 180, 195 (Lorenzo Fioramonti ed., 2012).
102. Directive 2000/60/EC Establishing a Framework for Community Action in
the Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1.
103. Lei No. 9.433 de 8 de Janeiro de 1997, Col. Leis Rep. Fed. Brasil, 190 (6, t.2):
4315-4844, Junho 1998 (Braz.)
104. Polfticade Recursos Hidricos deve PreverMetas e Puni des, Jornal do Senado, Ano
XV, No. 3.024, May 22, 2009, at 6.
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1. Cooperationwithin the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary
Assembly (EuroLat)
The creation of EuroLat was strongly advocated by the European
Parliament.
In November 2001, MEPs adopted a resolution
recognizing that EU-Latin American parliamentary dialogue has a
role in "lending legitimacy to the different integration processes
under way in both regions" and that it should be modernized by
setting up an EU-Latin American Transatlantic Assembly. 105 In April
2006, the EP reiterated the need for such an Assembly, while
undertaking to strengthen bi-regional parliamentary diplomacy
through the network of standing and ad hoc parliamentary
delegations to interparliamentary forums and through the inclusion
of EP liaison officers in the main Commission delegations in the
106
region.
On 8 November 2006, EuroLat was established in Brussels as a
parliamentary dimension of the Biregional Strategic Partnership
between the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean (EU-LAC). 107 Thids
multilateral parliamentary body succeeded the EU-Latin American
Interparliamentary Conference, which had convened biennially since
1974. EuroLat gathers 150 parliamentarians: 75 MEPs and 75 delegates
from the Latin American component, which consists of Parlatino,
Parlasur, the Andean Parliament, the Central American Parliament and
the Joint Parliamentary Committees with Mexico and Chile. EuroLat has
an Executive Secretariat, a Governing Board, a Plenary Assembly and
three standing committees. 108 The Council of the EU and the
Commission may actively participate in EuroLat's work.
According to the Constituent Act, the role of EuroLat is to
105. European Parliament, Resolution of November 15, 2001 on a global
partnership and a common strategy for relations between the European Union and
Latin America, 2002 O.J. (C 140E) 569.
106. European Parliament, Resolution of April 27, 2006 on a Stronger Partnership
Between the European Union and Latin America, 2006 O.J. (C 296E) 123.
107. Maria C. Gonzdlez, Eurolat:Une Assemblie ParlementaireEuro-Latino-Amdricaine,
515 REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN ET DE L'UNION EUROPIENNE 94-95 (2008); Stelios
Stavridis et al., The Origins,Structures and Functions of the Euro-Mediterraneanand EuroLatin American Interparliamentary Assemblies, in PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS OF
REGIONALIZATION

AND

GLOBALIZATION:

THE

ROLE

OF

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY

INSTITUTIONs 211, 221-226 (Olivier Costa et al., 2013) (description of its basic features).

108. EuroLat Constituent Act art. 4.
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"debate, control and review" all questions relating to the
Partnership.109 These questions cover a broad range of matters
including democracy, external policy, governance, integration, peace,
human rights, education, environment, culture as well as economic,
financial, commercial and social affairs. 110 In these policy areas
EuroLat may adopt resolutions, recommendations, opinions,
messages and statements for the attention of EU-LAC summits and
ministerial groups and conferences devoted to the development of
the Partnership."' EuroLat members may also put questions for oral
or written answer to the ministerial bodies of the Latin American
regional integration organizations, the Presidency-in-Office of the
112
EU-LAC Summit, the Council of the EU and the Commission.
Written questions and answers are published by the EU in its Official
Journal and by the participating regional integration parliaments.
Oral questions can be put during each session, upon decision by the
Executive Bureau, and they last up to two hours. The said executive
bodies are then invited to give brief answers and a debate may follow
if requested by at least twenty EuroLat members.
Given its composition, breadth of scope and the existence of
committees that ensure the completion of preparatory works between
the yearly conventions of the Plenary Assembly, 113 EuroLat provides
a forum for ongoing deliberation between MEPs and Brazilian
parliamentarians, who may be part of Parlatino and Parlasur
delegations. An early warning system, inspired by the one applied
in the European Union between national parliaments and EU
institutions," 4 could be installed within EuroLat to remedy the lack
of coordination between legislative initiatives of biregional interest

109. EuroLat Constituent Act art. 5.
110. EuroLat Constituent Act art. 2.
111. EuroLat Constituent Act art. 5; EuroLat Rules of Procedure.
112. EuroLat Rules of Procedure art. 20-21.
113. EuroLat Constituent Act art. 7.
114. See, e.g., Ian Cooper, A 'Virtual Third Chamber' for the European Union?
National Parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon, 35 W. EUR. POL. 441-465 (2012);
Davor Janek, Representative Democracy across Levels? National Parliaments and EU
Constitutionalism,8 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. & POL'Y 227-265 (2012); Philipp Kiiver,
THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY (2012).
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and to avoid the duplication of work where approaches converge.11 5
Besides this potential for policy collaboration, it has been argued that
EuroLat is the most adequate forum for maintaining a community of
values between the European and Latin American regions. 116
2. Cooperationbetween the EP and the Mercosur Parliament
(Parlasur)
Mercosur (Mercado Comfin del Sur or the Common Market of the
Southern Cone) was established by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991.
While this regional organization was founded by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, Paraguay was suspended in June 2012,
Venezuela became a full member in July 2012, and Bolivia has been en
route to membership since December 2012. Democracy lay at the root
of Mercosur and there is "huge and incontrovertible evidence that all
the key players perceived ... democracy as an important factor for
integration in the Southern Cone." 1 7 Apart from the Common Market
Council, Common Market Group, Trade Commission, EconomicSocial Consultative Forum and Administrative Secretariat, Mercosur
has its own Parliament.118
Envisaged originally as the Joint
119
Parliamentary Committee,
the 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol specified
that it was to be appointed by the participating national parliaments
and entrusted with the speeding up of the domestic implementation of
Mercosur decisions. 120 In December 2005, a Constitutive Protocol
replaced the Joint Parliamentary Committee with a directly elected
Mercosur Parliament. 121 While laying down its organization and
competence, which does not include legislation, 122 the Protocol charges

115. Jos6 JF. Alles & Maria T. F. Alles, La Cooperaci6nInterparlamentariaUnion Europea
- Iberoamrica: Una Estrategia entre el Marketing Politico y la Integraci6n Birregional, in
EUROPA-AMfiuCA LATINA. Dos CAMINOS, ZUN DEsrINo CoMuN? 41, 62 (2012).
116. Iris Vittini, La Asamblea Euro-Latinoamericana EuroLat. Antecendentes y su
Importancia para la Promoci6n de la Comunidad de Valores, in EUROPA-AMtRICA LATINA.
Dos CAMINOS, ZUN DESTINO COMUN? 21, 37 (2012).
117. GIAN L. GARDINI, THE ORIGINS OF MERCOSUR: DEMOCRACY AND
REGIONALIZATION IN SouTH AMERICA 151 (2010).
118. Protocol of Ouro Preto art. 1, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1994).
119. Protocol of Ouro Preto art. 24, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1994).
120. Protocol of Ouro Preto art. 22-25, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1994).
121. Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament art. 6, Dec. 9, 2005.
122. Andrs Malamud & Clarissa Dri, Spillover Effects and Supranational
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Parlasur with "maintaining institutional relations with parliaments of
third countries and other legislative institutions," which encompasses
123
the EP.
EU-Mercosur relations were established in 1995 by means of an
Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, which entered
into force in 1999.124 This Agreement strengthens the existing
relations between the two regions and sets the ground for an
interregional association. 125 Cooperation is to be developed in many
diverse fields, including economy, trade, intellectual property,
energy, transport, technology and environment. To this end, a
political dialogue on bilateral and multilateral issues is instituted at
the level of the respective executive branches (Heads of State,
ministers and senior officials).1 26 Although the Agreement makes no
mention of interparliamentary cooperation, it does encourage "closer
relations between the Parties and their respective institutions,"127
particularly by fostering regular exchanges of information, advice
and know-how. 128 The Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue
promotes "contacts, information exchanges, and consultation,
especially meetings at the appropriate level between the various
Parliaments: The Case of Mercosur, 19 JOURNAL OF IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN
RESEARCH 234-235 (2013) (The powers and achievements of Parlasur have so far been
rather limited).
123. Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament art. 4, Dec. 9, 2005.
124. Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European
Community and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Southern Common
Market and Its Party States, of the Other Part, 1996 O.J. (L 69) 4; See also Gisela MtillerBrandeck-Bocquet, Perspectivesfor a New Regionalism:Relations between the E U and the
Mercosur, 5 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 561-579 (2000); Paraskevi Bessa-Rodrigues,
European Union-Mercosul:In Search of a 'New' Relationship?, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV.
81-98 (1999); Sheila Page, The Relationship between the European Union and Mercosur,
34 THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 91-108 (1999); Sebastian Santander, The European
Partnershipwith Mercosur: A Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-Liberal Principles,
27 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 285-306 (2005).
125. Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament art. 2, Dec. 9, 2005
(negotiations on an Association Agreement began in 2000 and, after their suspension
in 2004, they were continued in 2010 and are currently ongoing). See also Andy Klom,
Mercosur and Brazil: A European Perspective, 79 INT'L AFF. 351-368 (2003) (a
practitioner's view on this).
126. Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement art. 3.
127. Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement art. 2.
128. Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement art. 19.
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Mercosur and European Union bodies," albeit that the provisions that
follow specify collaborative action of an executive nature.1 29 These
references nevertheless facilitate cooperation between the EU and
Mercosur parliaments. Indeed, Mercosur's Joint Parliamentary
Committee has periodically met with the EP since 1996. Until May
2008, there were 13 interparliamentary meetings between the EU and
30
Mercosur1
In its Regional Strategy Paper for Mercosur for 2007-2013, the
Commission assessed that Mercosur's democracy and transparency
deficiencies will "only partly be addressed" by Parlasur.131 Therefore,
the EU's first priority is the institutionalization of Mercosur and the
support for Parlasur's development. 132 The general objective is to
democratize Mercosur decisions and optimize the political relations
between the EU and Mercosur. The more concrete objectives are: (a)
to improve the domestic transposition of Mercosur acts; (b) to
reinforce the link between Mercosur decision-making and the citizens
in order to increase democratic legitimacy and public participation;
(c) to transfer know-how relating to Parlasur's administration,
communication and management and to the functioning of political
groups; and (d) to aid preparations for Parlasur direct elections. The
results sought include improved citizen access to Mercosur
institutions, better internal organization of Parlasur, greater
transparency and accountability of Mercosur institutions, and
smoother coordination between Parlasur and national parliaments.
The EU's financial support for Parlasur amounted to some 900.000
euros in the period 2002-2006.133
Finally, the second EU-Brazil summit agreed to "foster
collaboration" between Parlasur and the EP.134 Apart from the
129. Id. Emphasis added.
130. Clarissa Dri, Limits of the InstitutionalMimesis of the European Union: The Case
of the Mercosur Parliament,1 LAT. AM. POL'Y 63 (2010).
131. European Commission, Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013
E/2007/1640, at 17 (Feb. 8, 2007).
132. European Commission, Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013
E/2007/1640, at 28-29 (Feb. 8, 2007).
133. European Commission, Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013
E/2007/1640, at 63 (Feb. 8, 2007).
134. 2nd EU-Brazil Summit, Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership-Joint
Action Plan (Dec. 22, 2008).
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committees for foreign affairs (AFET), development (DEVE) and
international trade (INTA), the main body within the EP that deals
with Mercosur is the Delegation for relations with the Mercosur
countries. This Delegation originates in the Delegation for relations
with South America, which was renamed Delegation for South
America and Mercosur in 1996 and assumed its current name in 2004.
From June 1991 to April 2008, the EP visited Brazilian officials on seven
occasions within the arrangements for cooperation with Parlasur: five
times by this Delegation (June 1991, March 1992, September 1995, June
2000 and June 2003), once by the EP Presidency (May 1993), and once
by a group of MEPs (November 2003).13- These visits were inspired by
MEPs' wishes to participate in interregional negotiations on economic
agreements and to fortify their own legitimacy by stimulating the
136
creation of a new regional parliament.
This overview demonstrates that the relations between the EP
and Parlasur aim to have the former assist the latter in strengthening
its capacities rather than to spark legislative discussions. It has been
empirically shown that the EP was a role model for the establishment
and empowerment of Parlasur. 137
From the perspective of
multilayered international parliamentarism, all of these activities
benefit EU-Brazil relations. Within the auspices of EP-Parlasur
collaboration, MEPs and Brazilian parliamentarians have ample
opportunities for information exchange and institutional learning.
3. Cooperation between the EP and the Latin American

135. Clarissa Dri, Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case
of the Mercosur Parliament,1 LAT. AM. POL'Y 62 (2010).
136. Id. at 63.
137. Clarissa Dri, Building the Mercosur Parliament: Integration on European

Patterns?, in DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND CITIZENSHIP: A COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE
OF CONCEPTUAL FLOW (HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE

POLITICS, WORKING PAPER No. 59) (ivanta Schoettli ed., 2011); Clarissa Dri, Limits of
the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament,1
LAT. AM. POL'Y 64 (2010). See generally Sonia D. Camargo, Unido Europeia-Uma
Referncia Indispensdvel para o Mercosul, 21 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 83-122 (1999).

See also DEISY VENTURA,

As ASSIMETRIAS ENTRE 0 MERCOSUL E A UNIAo EUROPEIA: OS
DESAFIOS DE UMA AssOCIACAO INTERREGIONAL (2003); Mikhail Mukhametdinov,

Mercosur and the European Union: Variation among the Factors of Regional Cohesion, 42
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 207-228 (2007); Tobias Lenz, Spurred Emulation: the EU
and Regional Integrationin Mercosurand SADC, 35 W. EUR. POL. 155-173 (2012).
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Parliament(Parlatino)
Established on December 10, 1964, in Lima, Parlatino is an
independent, permanent, regional parliamentary organization
38
composed of 23 parliaments of South American and Caribbean states.
Its structure was only finalized in 1987, when the Institutionalization
Treaty was agreed. Along with a Board of Directors and a General
Secretariat, Parlatino is composed of an Assembly and 13 permanent
committees. The Assembly is the supreme body of the organization and
gathers 12-member national parliamentary delegations once a year in
1
Parlatino's seat in Panama City. 39
Parlatino possesses no decision-making authority other than to
issue non-binding declarations and recommendations, for which it
has been described as a "symbolic rather than an operative body
[that] lacks both political significance and social roots." 140
Nevertheless, Parlatino is a vivid demonstration of a forum for
parliamentary diplomacy and deliberation, 141 since it upholds not
only the principles of democracy and regional integration, but also
those of non-intervention and self-determination, while condemning
142
the use of force and promoting peaceful solutions to conflicts.
Similarly,
besides
supporting
representative
democracy,
constitutional and parliamentary development in Latin America,
Parlatino's purpose is to defend freedom, peace and security and
suppress colonialism, imperialism and discrimination in all its

138. Nerio Rausseo, El Rol del ParlamentoLatinoamericanoen el Fortalecimientode las
Instituciones de la Integraci6n (Paper prepared for VII Congreso Internacional del
CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administraci6n Pdblica, Lisbon, Portugal,
October 8-11, 2002), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/
documents/CLAD/clad0044402.pdf.
139. Parlatino Statute of 2 August 1991 as amended in 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006
and 2007 art. 12-14.
140. Andr~s Malamud & Luis de Sousa, Regional Parliaments in Europe and Latin
America: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance, in CLOSING OR WIDENING THE GAP?
LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 85, 92
(Andrea R. Hoffmann et al. eds., 2007).
141. Olivier Costa & Clarissa Dri, How Does the European Parliament Contribute to
the EU"s InterregionalDialogue?, in INTERSECTING INTERREGIONALISM: REGIONS, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE AND THE EU 129, 142 (Francis Baert et al. eds., 2014).
142. Parlatino Institutionalization Treaty of 16 November 1987 art. 2.
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guises. 143 Parlatino, while currently an IPA, is being considered as
the parliamentary organ of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) created in December 2011,144 which would
transform it into an IPO.
Another, rather ambitious, objective of Parlatino is to "maintain
relations with all parliaments of all geographical regions, as well as
with international organizations." 45 Importantly, this includes
relations with the EP, which were established in 1974 in the form of the
EU-Latin American Interparliamentary Conference. 146 The Conference
is held every other year and has helped tighten the historical, economic
and cultural links between the European and Latin American regions
and increase the parliamentarians' knowledge of the political systems
of the partner region.147 The key role of the Conference was to promote
democracy, human rights protection and development in Latin
America on the basis of European experiences. 148 The Conference also
49
recurrently examined the problem of Latin American external debt
For all its lack of power and infrequent meetings, Parlatino was among
the rare forums for the promotion of pan-Latin American consensus on
the pacification of Central America and the resolution of conflicts in the
region.150 In this context, Parlatino-EP cooperation substantially

143. Id. at 3-5, 7, 9.
144. See Havana Hosts Meeting of Latin American Parliament, Radio Cadena
Agramonte (May 26, 2011), available at www.cadenagramonte.cu/english/
index.php/show/articles/5774:havana-hosts-meeting-of-latinamerican-parliament
(last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
145. Parlatino Institutionalization Treaty, Art. 3(k), Nov. 16, 1987.
146. Marianne L. Wiesebron, Co-operation between the European Union and Latin
America: Privileged Relations?, in Los NUEvos ENFOQUES DEL LA INTEGRATION: MAS
ALLA DEL REGIONALISMO 229, 237 (Jaramilli Grace ed., 2008).
147. Clarissa Dri, Limits of the InstitutionalMimesis of the European Union: The Case
of the MercosurParliament,1 LAT. AM. POL'Y 57 (2010).
148. Michel L. Coral, El Didlogo Politico como Pilar de las Relaciones entre la Uni6n
Europea y America Latina: Reflexiones Sobre su Desarrollo y Contenido, 12 OASIs
(Observatorio de Andlisis de los Sistemas Internacionales) 485 (2007).
149. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Briefing Note on
Interparliamentary Cooperation Between the European Union and Latin America
(1974-2003), p. 13 (Apr. 3, 2003) (update of the 1999 Working Document "25 Years of
Interparliamentary Cooperation Between the European Union and Latin America,"
doc. no. POLI107a XX).
150. Susane Gratius & Delfet Nolte, Parlamento Transnacional e Integracbo: A
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contributed to the development of the "acquis" of EU-LAC relations.' 5 '
Still, although Conference meetings played a part in "guiding the
legislative acts and the political initiatives" of the EP towards Latin
America, the MEPs themselves recognize that this forum has "little

influence on parliamentary activity," which is why this forum focused
on political dialogue and exchange of views more than on policymaking and legislative initiatives. 5 2 Nonetheless, the EP was seen in
Latin America as a driver of bilateral relations, whereby MEPs sought to
insert this region on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy
agenda.153 The Conference was superseded by EuroLat.

V. The EU Returns Directive: Multilayered International
Parliamentarism in Action?
The Returns Directive

54

provides an excellent example of

regulatory and legislative interdependence between the EU, Brazil
and the Latin American region in general and of the way multilayered
parliamentarism was employed to address the fallout created by the
EU's enactment of politically sensitive policies in the field of

immigration.
This Directive was fervently contested by many Latin American
governments,
regional
organizations
and
parliamentary
institutions.155 This, together with the concern expressed by the UN
Human Rights Council over the protection of the fundamental rights
Experincia do Parlamento Europeu e as Liga3es que a America Latina Tern para o Mercosul,
1 PLENARIUM (Periodical of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies), 78, 88 (2004).
151. Jos( J. J. F. Ferndndez, La Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana
(EuroLat) y la Dimension Parlamentariade la Asociacion EstratigicaBirregionalUE-LAC:
Evolucion y Perspectivas, (Paper prepared for Simposio Sobre Las Relaciones Union
Europea-Amerfca Latina: La Dimension Parlamentaria - VI Congreso CEISAL,
Toulouse, France, July 1, 2010) at 3.
152. Clarissa Dri, Limits of the InstitutionalMimesis of the European Union: The Case
of the Mercosur Parliament,1 LAT. AM. POL'Y 64 (2010).
153. Carlos D. Martin, Las RelacionesAmirica Latina-Uni6n Europea:Antecedentes de
la Importanciae Institucionalizaci6ndel Didlogo Politico,22 REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLUTICA
(Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile) 52, 62 (2002).
154. Directive 2008/115/EC on Common Standards and Procedures in Member
States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98.
155. Jos6 A. Sanahuja, The European Union and Latin America: The Common Agenda
after the Lima Summit, 7 INSTITUTO COMPLUTENSE DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES PAPER
3 (2008).
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of irregular migrants, was unprecedented in the history of EU
legislation.156 The two most controversial provisions were those
foreseeing the possibility of detaining irregular third-country
migrants for up to 18 months and of imposing a reentry ban of up to
five years. The Directive was adopted at first reading without a single
157
amendment by the EP, which succumbed to the Council's pressure.
This fact tarnished its democratic image and incurred international
outcry.158 The two provisions were criticized not least by the
Brazilian Congress, Parlasur and Parlatino, all of which sent a strong
message of indignation to the EU.
On 26 June 2008, a week after the EP's approval of the Directive,
the Committee of Human Rights and Minorities of the Brazilian
Chamber of Deputies adopted an Official Note against the
Directive. 159 Relying on the universality of human rights, this Note
condemned the Directive for colliding with the principles of
coexistence, tolerance and prevalence of human rights, which
constituted what was seen as a "grave historical setback," given that
millions of Europeans had settled in Latin America in the past 500
years. The Note warned that the Directive added to the losses caused
by the EU's unfair commercial policies and subsidies. The Committee
therefore requested the EP to reconsider and modify its decision. This
came several months after the same Committee sought to discuss
with the European and Spanish parliaments the increased
deportation of Brazilians from EU ports of entry, especially the
deportation from the Madrid airport of a Brazilian physics student

156. Anneliese Baldaccini, The Return and Removal of IrregularMigrants under EU
Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive, 11 EuR. J.MIGRATION & L. 2 (2009).
157. See Ariadna R. Servent, The European Parliamentand the Returns Directive: The
End of Radical Contestation; The Start of Consensual Constraints, in THE SOCIAL,
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTOURS OF DEPORTATION 43-58 (Bridget Anderson et al.
eds., 2013).
158. Diego Acosta, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the European
ParliamentBecoming Bad and Ugly?, 11 EuR. J. MIGRATION & L. 22, 38-39 (2009).
159. Camera dos Deputados, Comissao de Direitos Humanos e Minorias, Nota
Oficial da Comissao de Direitos Humanos e Minorias (June 26, 2008), available at
www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoespermanentes/cdhm/arquivos/nota-oficial-contra-lei-que-criminalizaimigracao.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
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intent on attending a conference in Lisbon. 160 This affair was
discussed in a public hearing in the Committee for External Relations
and National Defence.161 The latter Committee also repudiated the
Directive. 162 Brazilian MPs criticized it in the plenary too. The
Directive was called "the Directive of Shame" for introducing the
"delict of immigration," which in their view ran counter to the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, as customary
international law, enshrines a right for everyone to leave his or her
own country and freely move and reside within the borders of each
state. 163 Brazilian senators also reacted in the plenary invoking
similar arguments and seeking further reflection on the Directive
from the EU.164
Two days before the Chamber of Deputies issued its Official Note
impugning the Directive, Parlatino adopted a declaration calling for a
revision of the Directive so as to "eliminate its eminently repressive
character." 165 Three days later, Parlasur followed suit with its own
declaration rejecting the Directive as repugnant to human rights,
calling upon the EP to review the Directive and inviting Mercosur
governments to take "corresponding measures." 166 The then Brazilian
160. Cam~ra dos Deputados, Comissdo deve discutirimigra~do corn Parlamentoeuropeu,
available at http://agencia-camara.justica.inf.br/noticia/2008/03/comissao-devediscutir-inigracao-parlamento-europeu (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
161. Mariane Almeida, Ivan Valente propde grupoparlamentarparatratarda imigracdo
brasileira na Espanha, available at www.sindsprevr.org.br/jornal/secao.asp?area=
24&entrada=1886 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
162. Jornal da Camara, Ano 9, No. 2061, June 20, 2008, p. 2.
163. See the intervention by Manuela d'Avila MP in: Camara dos Deputados,
Plenario no. 159.2.53.0 of July 2, 2008, p. 134, available at www.camara.leg.br/
intemet/plenario/notas/ordinari/V020708.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014).
164. See the speech by senator Antonio Carlos Valadares in: Dirio do Senado
Federal no. 96 of June 26, 2008, p. 23839. See also the speech by Oto Agripino Maia,
the then Undersecretary-General for Brazilian Communities Abroad in: Didrio do
Senado Federal no. 4 of February 4, 2010, p. 954.
165. Declaraci6n de la Presidencia del Parlamento Latinoamericano sobre la
Directiva del Parlarnento Europeo y del Consejo Relativa a Procedimientos y Normas
Comunes en los Estados Miernbros para el Retorno de los Nacionales de Terceros
Paises que se Encuentren Ilegalmente en su Territorio of June 24, 2008, available at
www.parlatino.org/es/presidencia/declaraciones-y-resoluciones/ declaraciones/
660.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
166. Declaraci6n no. 20/2008 en Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de los
Migrantes (June 27, 2008), available at www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/
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President of Parlasur, Dr. Rosinha, invoked the Latin American
rejection of the Directive as an example of direct influence on
167
intergovernmental decisions.
Having incurred much international reprimand, the EP sought to
appease Latin American concerns within EuroLat. The latter's copresidents issued a joint statement on July 14, 2008, recommending to
intensify interparliamentary dialogue through various existing
channels. 168 This was followed on November 6, 2008, for the first time,
by the novel out-of-session discussions between, on the one hand, the
EuroLat Executive Bureau accompanied by all other EuroLat members
and, on the other hand, Jacques Barrot, the then Vice-President of the
169
Commission, who was in charge of the Directive.
Consequently, a working group on migration in EU-LAC
relations (Working Group) was established within EuroLat in Madrid
on April 6, 2009. The Working Group's aims were threefold: (a) to
draw up fundamental principles for a biregional consensus on
migration, allowing differentiated treatment when EU legislation is
applied to Latin American and Caribbean migrants; (b) to monitor the
transposition of the Returns Directive in the EU Member States; and
(c) to encourage the establishment of a Euro-Latin American
migration observatory.170 The Working Group was also to function
as a watchdog taking stock of pending and future EU migration
initiatives as well as of Latin American policies in this area. 171 Some
innovaportal/file/ 7493/1/decl.10_2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
167. Jornal da Camara, Ano 9, No. 2061, 20 June 2008, p. 2 .
168. Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana, Comunicado de los CoPresidentes da la Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana sobre la Directiva de
Retorno (july 14, 2008), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/
documents/declarations/directiva-retomo 07_2008_es.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014).
169. Jos6 J. J. F. Fernandez, La Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana
(EuroLat) y la Dimension Parlamentariade la Asociacion EstratdgicaBirregional UE-LAC:
Evolucfon y Perspectivas, (Paper prepared for Simposio Sobre Las Relaciones Union
Europea-America Latina: La Dimension Parlamentaria - VI Congreso CEISAL,
Toulouse, France, July 1, 2010) at 16.
170. Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana, Press Release, Antigua
Guatemala (Feb. 27, 2009), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/
documents/press~statements/bureauantigua_2009_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
171. Working Group on Migration in Relations between the European Union,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Minutes, Spanish Congress of Deputies, Madrid
(Apr. 6-7, 2009) at 2.
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three months later, on June 30, 2009, a biregional intergovernmental
dialogue on migration was launched. The Working Group thus had
yet another impetus to accomplish its main objective, which was to
draft recommendations for the next EU-LAC summit. This was
completed on May 15, 2010, and the EU was strongly requested to
ameliorate the legal regime of LAC migration. The Working Group
warned that: "When transposing the Returns Directive, with which
the LAC countries disagree, the EU Member States must retain the
more favourable provisions already laid down in their domestic
law." 172 It is notable that most recommendations were cast in strong
peremptory language demanding for very specific action to be taken.
Before the adoption of the Directive, EuroLat's pronouncements had
mainly taken the form of declarations that contained rather loose and
advisory prescriptions. 173 This means that the Directive caused a
hardening of EuroLat's stance towards this aspect of EU immigration
policy. The Working Group recommendations were sent inter alia to
the Council of the EU, the Commission and all national parliaments
of the EU Member States. In line with the recommendations, a
message was sent to the 6th EU-LAC summit, proposing to create a
migration observatory for the EU-LAC area. 74 In May 2011, the EP
published its own study on such an observatory, which would
harmonize databases, assess public policies and conduct research on
migration.175 Although the purpose of the Working Group was
fulfilled with the submission of the said recommendations, EuroLat
authorized the continuation of its activities chiefly because the 6th
EU-LAC summit failed to address the issue of the observatory. The
Working Group subsequently issued a joint proposal for the creation
of the observatory in February 2012. Yet the activities of the Working

172. Working Group on Migration in Relations between the European Union,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Recommendation: Migration in EU-LAC, (May
15, 2010) at 5.
173. Stelios Stavridis & Natalia Ajenjo, EU-Latin American ParliamentaryRelations:
Some PreliminaryComments on the EuroLat, 10 JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER
14 (2010).
174. Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, Message to 6th European
Union-Latin American and Caribbean Summit, Madrid (May 18, 2010) at 3.
175. European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Proposal for
the Creation of an Observatory for Migration between the EU and Latin America and
the Caribbean (Anna Ayuso & Elena SAnchez-Montijano).
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Group go beyond this matter and its latest task was to draft
recommendations on the impact of the economic and financial crises
on EU-LAC migration. Ironically, the topicality of migration in
biregional relations was proven in practice when certain Latin
American representatives of EuroLat were reportedly subjected to
discriminatory treatment when landing at Madrid and Frankfurt
airports. 176
However, despite international protests against the Returns
Directive, the EP did not move any amendment and its text remained
unchanged. On the one hand, one may reasonably question the
degree of influence that international parliamentarism has had in this
case. On the other hand, legislative amendment is not the only
indicator of influence; it is merely the strongest one. Many
parliaments experience similar constraints in both domestic and
supranational arenas, whether due to the forces of parliamentary
democracy and tight government grip over parliamentary majorities
or due to the constitutional or political lack of power in the first place.
Moreover, the thesis about the erosion of parliaments, advanced
notably by Lord Bryce in the early 1920s, precedes most transnational
economic and political integration projects, which have merely
exacerbated the already spiraling parliamentary decline in modern
democracies. 177 On the other hand, although a concrete impact on the
final text of the Directive was absent, the developments surrounding
its adoption exhibit the escalation of parliamentary activity via
numerous bilateral and multilateral frameworks. The aftermath of
the Directive caused "parliamentary spillover" of policy monitoring,
which gave rise to new interparliamentary channels of oversight.
Acting in an international environment, Brazilian, other Latin
American and European parliamentarians engaged in norm
entrepreneurship, with the former exerting pressure on the EU
towards policy alteration. 178
In this respect, in March 2014 the Commission published a report

176. Working Group on Migration in Relations Between the European Union,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Minutes, Seimas, Vilnus (July 16, 2013) at 2.
177. JAMES BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES - VOLUME II 344 (1921).
178. See generally Zlatko abi , International Parliamentary Institutions: A Research
Agenda, in PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS OF REGIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION: THE
ROLE OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS 20, 21 (Olivier Costa et al. eds., 2013).
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on the EU returns policy, which identified shortcomings in the
implementation of the Returns Directive and called for special
attention to be paid when implementing the provisions related to the
detention of returnees, the treatment of minors and the
corresponding safeguards and legal remedies, all of which were the
object of criticism by Brazilian and other Latin American
parliamentarians. Furthermore, although the report makes no
specific mention of the Latin American "uprising" against the
Directive, the Commission acknowledged that an effective
management of irregular migration flows requires a comprehensive
approach, which necessitates an "enhanced dialogue and cooperation
with non-EU countries of origin" and the "integration of foreign
policy aspects into the EU migration policy and ensuring linkages
between the internal and the external dimensions." 179 The EU
executive hence recognized the impact of EU policies on its
international partners and called for a more streamlined decisionmaking process in order to accommodate their interests and prevent
their possible retaliation or refusal to assist with the smooth
implementation of EU law. The concern was that the commitments,
mutual undertakings and new scrutiny mechanisms might make it
politically more difficult for the EU to enact future measures that
directly impinge on the interests of its international partners. As Lisa
Martin rightly cautions, "In an interdependent economy and polity,
legislators would be foolish to ignore the implications of other states'
actions for their constituents' well-being." 180
Additionally, migration is not the only area where parliamentary
rapprochement could add value. The global financial and European
debt crises, as well as the differing macroeconomic policies of the EU
and the Brazil, provide fodder for interparliamentary liaison not least
to avoid "mutual cognitive dissonance," whereby the EU is viewed
as "lecturing" Brazil on economics and banking.1 8 1 Such goal179. European Commission, Communication of the European Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy, COM (2014) 199 (March
28, 2014), at 7.
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oriented interaction among parliaments is applicable to any other
region of the world.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This article has argued that representative democracy is
gradually becoming globalized through the international interplay of
parliaments. International parliamentarism is growing into "an
increasingly effective forum for the resolution of international
problems." 182 This evolution no longer occurs solely within isolated
international parliamentary bodies. Instead, the cooperation between
parliamentarians beyond domestic borders is progressively
structured in layers, whereby they act within several international
parliamentary forums in the same period regarding the same region.
The multilayered character of international parliamentary activity is
demonstrated using the example of the Latin American region and an
in-depth case study of EU-Brazil relations.
The preceding analysis shows that the layers of parallel
parliamentary communication on diverse issues may furnish benefits
for their participants that action within a single international
interparliamentary framework might not.
Opportunities for
transferring knowledge and information both within one and the same
participating parliament (e.g., among MEPs) and between two or more
parliaments (e.g., between MEPs and Brazilian parliamentarians) refer
both to internal organization and management and to interregional
and global
policy-making.
Intensified
dialogue among
parliamentarians may lead to the adoption of better policies
domestically and a more coherent action globally.
While international parliamentary bodies are sometimes
admonished for serving as nothing more than venues for political
marketing, they do have their own agendas and, although their
pronouncements are as a rule not normative, they carry political
value insofar as they influence the topics deliberated in parliaments,
which is manifested, for instance, by the number of resolutions the

eds., 2012).
182. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal
Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199, 219
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
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EP has adopted on topics related to Latin America. 183 The reverse
influence is beyond doubt and, in the case of Mercosur, it has been
widely acknowledged, albeit not unquestionably. 8 4
Where
does
this
leave
multilayered
international
parliamentarism and its utility for democratizing international,
interregional and domestic law and politics? Benefits are multiple
and include increased policy deliberation and transparency,
discussion and contestation, networking and socialization,
accumulation of knowledge and information, acquisition of skills,
capacity building, assumption of joint positions, and the reduction of
transnational regulatory irritants. Parliaments therefore exhibit
resilience and actively seek to counter intergovernmental dominance
in global affairs within the constitutional margins available to them.
However, even in a multilayered parliamentary world, constraints on
the global action of parliamentarians, such as the lack of power to
issue binding pronouncements, remain salient. Not only do these
barriers diminish their clout, they also limit their outreach. Even so,
concerted action by parliamentarians across levels and within various
frameworks might improve the prospects of influencing
governmental actors and making them more accountable.
The responses of the Brazilian Congress, Parlatino, Parlasur, the
EP and EuroLat to the Returns Directive exemplify the functioning,
advantages
and
obstacles
of
multilayered
international
parliamentarism. The establishment and continued work of the
EuroLat Working Group on EU-LAC Migration, as well as the push
for the creation of a migration observatory, are distinct products of
parliamentary diplomacy that aim to enable "soft" democratic
control over decisions of biregional interest. 185 While parliamentary
activism was triggered by the Returns Directive, it was soon
decoupled from what became a veritable migration saga that caused
parliamentarians to embark on a much wider investigation of
183. Jos6 J.F. Alles & Maria T.F. Alles, La Cooperaci6nInterparlamentariaUnion Europea
- lberoamirica: Una Estrategiaentre el Marketing Polftico y la Integraci6n Birregional, in
EUROPA-AMIRICA LATINA. Dos CAMINOS, ZUN DESTINO CoMitN? 41, 60 (2012).
184. WENZEL MATIASKE ET AL., THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A MODEL FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MERCOSUR? TRANSNATIONAL ORDERS BETWEEN ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (2007).

185. Working Group on Migration in Relations between the European Union, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Minutes, Montevideo, Uruguay (May 17, 2011) at 3.
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biregional policy-making.
For the EP, increased contact with
Brazilian and other Latin American parliamentarians can both further
its democracy promotion agenda and fortify its position in the
ongoing rivalry with the Commission and the Council in conducting
EU foreign affairs. 186 For the Brazilian Congress, intensified relations
with MEPs represent a channel through which to voice their
preoccupation over the EU's inconsistent treatment of Brazil as both
a Western Latin American country, a Mercosur member and a BRICS
country, 187 and thus mitigate politico-economic friction while
nurturing common understandings. This is all the more important
because the EU is perceived in Brazil both as an opportunity and as a
challenge to the latter's national interest. 8 8 Namely, during both Lula
and Rousseff administrations, Brazil and the EU held conflicting
views on trade and there was little overlap in their strategy
preferences in multilateral international institutions. 189 Closer
parliamentary ties may contribute to reducing the negative
EU-Brazil
the
thereof.
Significantly,
consequences
interparliamentary partnership is indispensable for democratic
legitimacy insofar as they engender new public spaces that "play a
critical role in setting limits on government, above and beyond those
controls already enshrined in formal state institutions." 90
Finally, while inspired by their domestic electoral mandates and
constitutional prerogatives, the roles that parliamentarians perform
on the interregional and global plane are cast in "soft" instruments,
such as recommendations and messages. Rather than legislating,
they advocate legal solutions. Instead of censuring governments,
they exert pressure for policy change. Though the ultimate goal of
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international parliamentarism is to influence intergovernmental
decision-making, this is an inherently incremental process that is
premised on a much more informal capacity to mobilize political
support and steer policy development. 191 In this regard, multilayered
international interactions between parliamentarians may facilitate
the production of critical masses in favour or against certain policy
enactments and, as such, feed the overall democratic process. In
Habermas' vernacular, the discursive character of their opinionformation unleashes "the generative force of communicative
freedom," 192 which helps shape the public sphere and the democratic
frame of lawmaking.
In the global arena, the greatest contribution of parliaments to
democracy is to facilitate the public exposure of contested decisions,
whereby elected officials discuss and publicize their vices and virtues
in an exchange of policy-oriented arguments. The parliaments'
chronic lack of "hard" constitutional powers in the international
sphere shifts focus towards deliberation as the substantive element of
the political process. To the extent that this constitutes political
constraint, it is possible to conceive of multilayered international
parliamentarism as the nucleus of a rudimentary and composite form
of proto-global parliamentarism and constitutionalism.

191. This could be likened to the 'external deliberation' function of parliaments in
general. See Virgilio A. da Silva, Deciding without Deliberating,11 INT'LJ.CONsT. L. 564 (2013).
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